Likewise, the naval infantry brigade attached to the Baltic Sea Fleet has seen improvement and equipment modernization in recent years, and there are plans to increase Russia’s submarine presence in the region. Its Steregushchiy class corvettes are equipped with advanced stealth, radar and electronic warfare systems, and have missile systems that can strike targets on land with precision - a capability new to the fleet. This fleet has largely been neglected, but has seen modernization programs since 2007. Russian Capabilities Baltic Sea FleetĪs of 2017, the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet stationed in Kronstadt and Baltiysk features two tactical submarines, two destroyers, six frigates, 23 patrol and coastal combatant vessels, 12 mine warfare and mine-countermeasure vessels, four amphibious tank landing ships, and nine other smaller amphibious landing craft. ![]() ![]() Likewise, bottlenecks may also be blockaded and mined to establish local sea control or denial. They are ideal bases, supply hubs, staging areas, and jumping off points for special operations or surprise ambushes. The islands, especially those belonging to Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Estonia thus hold critical strategic significance. As retired Swedish Navy Captain Bo Wallander noted, “It’s easy to hide if you are an aggressor here there are short transit times and short reaction times,” leaving defenders with little time to react. ![]() However, the geography of the many archipelagos and larger islands creates difficulties for permanent surveillance and provides opportunities to evade observation. Each of these routes is heavily traveled, and closely monitored and thoroughly surveyed. Shipping is confined to channels through the Baltic’s bottlenecks and turns as a result of outlying islands and the unusual characteristics of the water itself.īottlenecks, such as the Danish Straits and the entrances to the Gulfs of Riga, Finland, and Bothnia, allow for easy and complete surveillance of the local maritime situation. Combined with cold winters, the low salt content in the Baltic Sea results in high levels of surface ice. This causes problems for sensors and other navigational and surveillance equipment. These pockets have a higher salinity than the surrounding water, creating spots where sound waves deflect. Alongside the low salinity, “salt pockets” are common in the Baltic Sea. In relation to other seas, the Baltic is generally shallow, and low salinity results in further complicated conditions for sailors. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, coasts are poorly marked and the waters along these coasts are unusually shallow. The Baltic Sea is a narrow, confined sea with many jagged shorelines, scattered islands, and other operational hazards. Map of the Baltic Sea highlighting narrow access, outlying islands and archipelagos, and jagged coastlines in some localities. By strategizing procurements, crisis response, and coastal defense, the long-standing condition of “sea blindness” can be reversed. Given the economic and strategic importance of the Baltic Sea itself to the Baltic states and NATO, this situation must be remedied. NATO as a whole is unprepared for Russian aggression at sea. The Baltic states face myriad hybrid and conventional threats from Russia in the maritime domain. Combine that with Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities based in Kaliningrad and the logistical chokepoint of the Suwałki Gap, and the strategic calculus for NATO in the Baltic theater becomes extraordinarily difficult. Likewise, in the event of grey zone activities (i.e., hostile activities which generally fall below the threshold of war) and/or surprise offensive military action, there is very little that the Baltic states or NATO could do to stop Russia. In the case of the latter, there is very little that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could do to prevent Russia from projecting power into their port facilities, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, or other littoral areas. Though its Baltic Fleet is not particularly impressive, Russia could use it to harass military and civilian activity at sea and take surprise offensive military action. In the Baltic Sea Region, the maritime status quo favors Russia. But with a heavy emphasis on land-based deterrence since re-independence, the Baltic states and NATO alike have been largely plagued by what experts refer to as “sea apathy” or “ sea blindness.” This has led to gaps in capabilities, strategy, and procurements, as well as vulnerabilities related to critical infrastructure under sea and onshore. ![]() In June, NATO conducted a scaled down version of its annual BALTOPS naval drills in the Baltic Sea.
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